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 1 
PART I   
Introduction 
A. Destructive Economic Policies in the Age of Terrorism1 
The Age of Terrorism highlights that government-sanctioned gambling is economically and politically 
destabilizing. As exemplified by casinos, gambling provides quick and substantial quantities of stable cash flow 
to the owners of the gambling establishments, and particularly in less-secure governmental systems, the owners 
are often associated with groups dedicated to destabilizing the government, such as organized crime, terrorist, 
and rebel groups. 
One example of this phenomenon during the late 1990s was Yasser Arafat’s and the Palestinian Authority’s 
largest, most profitable, and most stable asset—a Jericho casino—built with U.S. gambling technology, 
sanctioned by the Israeli government, patronized by Israeli tourists, and dedicated to finance the Palestinians’ 
destructive policy toward Israel.2 During the 1990s, the Israeli government could have prevented the 
establishment of the Jericho casino, but it did not,3 and the trend was even toward allowing more casinos and 
gambling activities. 
During the 1990s, the world’s economic leadership ensconced in the United States largely ignored the rapid 
spread of legalized gambling from the Nevada establishment into the United States and the international 
community. This laissez faire attitude by U.S. governmental and economic policymakers signaled and 
encouraged the rapid embracing of the U.S. gambling industry’s philosophies and technologies by other 
countries trying to emulate U.S. economic growth. Lost in the differentiation between entrepreneurial policies 
enhancing long-term economic efforts, and gambling policies cannibalizing the short-term economic wealth, 
governments worldwide ignored or forgot the basic principle that government-sanctioned gambling encourages 
transboundary economic raiding and destabilizes national and international economies. On a strategic scale, 
widespread government-sanctioned gambling activities constitute inherently destructive economic policy. 
Specifically, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat divulged his administration’s financial secrets in 2000, 
revealing “a multimillion dollar slush fund to a state monopoly on cement and a $60 million share in a highly 
profitable casino.”4 For years, the international community had demanded that the Palestinian government 
                                                           
1 This particular article is summary in scope, but it was conceived within the penumbra of the McDougal/Lasswell model for 
decision-making. In the areas of legal and governmental policy, which subsume strategic socio-economic and business 
concerns, the classic decision-making models were formulated by post-legal realists, in particular Professor Myres 
McDougal and Professor Harold Lasswell who postulated a conceptual framework for legal decision-making in a landmark 
article directed toward legal educators and law professors. Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and 
Public Policy Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943); see also Harold D. Lasswell & Myres 
S. McDougal, Criteria for a Theory about Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 362 (1971); Myres S. McDougal, Jurisprudence for a 
Free Society, 1 GA. L. REV. 1 (1966); John W. Kindt, An Analysis of Legal Education and Business Education Within the 
Context of a J.D./MBA Program, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 512, 517-518 (1981); John W. Kindt, An Analysis of Legal Education 
and Business Education Within the Context of a J. D./MBA Programme, 13 LAW TEACHER 12, 14-16 (1979). The 
decision-making concepts, which McDougal and Lasswell introduced, were later expanded to include international law and 
U.S. domestic law, as these areas interfaced with “policy-oriented jurisprudence.” Since then, their approach to law has 
received increasing acceptance and has become the major approach in the area of international law. See John N. Moore, 
Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudence of Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, 54 VA. L. REV. 662 (1968); Frederick 
Tipson, Note, The Lasswell-McDougal Enterprise: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity, 14 VA. J. INT’L L. 535 
(1974). 
2 Associated Press, Arafat Divulges Financial Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (ON THE WEB), July 4, 2000, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/i/AP-Palestinian-Money-Trail.html [hereinafter Arafat Divulges Financial Secrets]. 
3 See, e.g., Presentation by Israeli Representatives, National Coalition Against Legalized Gambling, Annual Conf., Orlando, 
Fla., Sept. 27-29,1995. 
4 Arafat Divulges Financial Secrets, supra note 2. 
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disclose its financial dealings, which, once revealed, showed “millions of dollars in tax revenues to secret 
accounts...to which only Arafat and a few close advisers”5 had access. Close to $530 million did not reach the 
Palestinian Treasury in 1998 and 1999, according to a Palestinian financial report released in 2000.6 
Significantly, the “largest holding, valued at $60 million, was a thirty percent stake in a casino in the West Bank 
town of Jericho.”7 Prior to the 2000 report, “the Palestinian Authority refused to acknowledge its involvement 
in the casino, apparently fearing criticism”8 from the international community including “Islamic 
fundamentalists who oppose gambling on religious grounds.”9 These developments highlight the need for 
strategic analyses of government policies involving legalized gambling activities and their impact on national 
and international communities—particularly the economic security issues in the Age of Terrorism. 
B. U.S. Legalized Gambling as Destabilizing World Economies? 
As countries around the world and the G7 periodically consider options to help pull their economies out of 
recurrent economic malaise, many theories are being presented and evaluated. Although many of the causal 
factors of economic downturns can be identified, international policymakers and economists have missed the 
economic and political significance of the international megatrend toward legalizing organized gambling 
activities. The U.S. gambling industry constitutes a classic example of an industry plagued by “corruption and 
cronyism” which was thematic of the destabilizing economic factors highlighted by President Clinton in his 
October 16, 1998 speech at the IMF/World Bank Meeting. Unfortunately, the U.S. gambling companies have 
set the standards for the world and have touted themselves as the economic “wave of the future.” 
Throughout the 1990s, gambling activities were being organized and legalized on an unprecedented scale. 
By 2000, the $61.4 billion in gross revenues of the U.S. gambling industry10 nearly doubled the combined 
revenues of the entire U.S. sports, movie, music, and theme-park industries.  The academic research reviewed in 
this analysis demonstrates the destabilizing influence of gambling on most economic systems and suggests that 
it can even collapse the economies of less-developed countries—due in part to their lack of safeguards and 
infrastructure.11 Gambling destabilizes economies due to negative externalities in the form of gambling 
addictions, bankruptcies, crime, and corruption. As quantified by reports delimited in this analysis, the 
socio-economic costs of legalized gambling far outweigh any possible benefits that it could bring to any 
economy. 
C. New Addicted Gamblers Caused by Government Policies 
New government-sponsored gambling creates substantial numbers of new pathological (addicted) and problem 
gamblers. For example, in the United States, from 1994 to 1997, legalized gambling created 1.5 million new 
pathological (addicted) gamblers.12 Pathological gambling is a recognized addictive behavior according to the 





9 Arafat Divulges Financial Secrets, supra note 2. 
10 Gross Annual Wager, 22 INT’L GAMING & WAGERING BUS. 1, 32 (2001) [hereinafter Gross Annual]. 
11 Statement of Prof. John Warren Kindt, Univ. Ill., to the National Gambling Impact Study Commission, “U.S. and 
International Concerns Over the Socio-Economic Costs of Legalized Gambling: Greater than the Illegal Drug Problem?,” 
Chicago, Ill., May 21, 1998 [hereinafter U.S. and International Costs]. For tables indicating the extent and range of 
socio-economic costs pursuant to expert analyses, see John W. Kindt, The Costs of Addicted Gamblers: Should the States 
Initiate Mega-Lawsuits Similar to the Tobacco Cases?, 22 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 17, Tables A1-14 (2001) 
[hereinafter Mega-Lawsuits]. 
12 See Howard J. Shaffer, Matthew N. Hall, & Joni Vander Bilt, Div. on Addictions, Harvard Medical School, Estimating the 
Prevalence of Disordered Gambling Behavior in the United States and Canada: A Meta-Analysis 43, Tables 13, 16, & 51 
(1997) [hereinafter Harvard Addictions Meta-Analysis]; Press Release, Harvard Medical School, Harvard Medical School 
Researchers Map Prevalence of Gambling Disorders in North America (Dec. 4, 1997) (finding that from 0.84 percent, “the 
prevalence rate [for pathological gambling] for 1994-1997 grew to 1.29 percent of the adult population”). 
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American Psychiatric Association (APA).13 A 1994 resolution of the American Medical Association estimated 
the U.S. socio-medical costs at $40 billion per year, and these costs continued to increase.14 
Associate Professor Howard J. Shaffer of the Harvard Division on Addictions reported in 1995: “Gambling 
is an addictive behavior, make no mistake about it .... Gambling has all the properties of a psychoactive 
substance, and again, the reason is that it changes the neurochemistry of the brain.”15 Addictions to gambling 
not only weaken society as a whole, but impose a great burden on both gamblers and non-gamblers alike in the 
form of increased taxes, based on social costs running into the billions of dollars per year.16 
D. New Bankruptcies Caused by Government-Sponsored Gambling 
Although it is difficult to measure exactly how much the increase in bankruptcies is related to the increase in 
gambling, a strong correlation exists. The reason for the difficulty in measuring the effects of gambling on 
bankruptcy can be compared to the difficulty of measuring the exact effects of the 1998 Asian financial crisis on 
the U.S. stock markets. 
According to a 1997 study sponsored by the U.S. banking industry,17 it was established that a significant 
relationship exists between legalizing gambling and causing new bankruptcies. However, the exact impact is 
difficult to measure due to the large amount of “noise” in the measurements. University of Utah Law Professor 
Richard I. Aaron believes the relationship between increased gambling and increased bankruptcy to be so strong 
and so obvious that to even question the relationship is “simply not worth asking.”18 
E. New Crime and Corruption Caused by Government-Sponsored Gambling 
Virtually all pathological gamblers commit crimes, but most are not prosecuted because the crimes are against 
family members or close associates. Experts and studies report that between twelve-and-a-half and twenty-three 
percent of pathological gamblers will become incarcerated.19 Political scientists note that governments should 
not encourage or promote criminal behavior or crimes—which governments do when they legalize, advertise, 
and promote gambling.20 
Legalized gambling has many negative social aspects that make it a disingenuous policy for governments to 
support. Aside from the social justice debate that legalized gambling makes “poor people poorer,” simple 
cost-benefit analysis shows the financial perils that gambling imposes on a nation. One representative analysis 
performed in 1996 indicates that the costs imposed on society are anywhere from two to six times greater than 
any possible benefits that can be gained from legalized gambling activities.21 
                                                           
13 AM. PSYCH. ASSN., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 615-18, Sec. 312.31 (1994) 
[hereinafter DSM-IV]. 
14 Am. Med. Assoc., House of Delegates Resolution 430 (A-94) (1994). 
15 Ford Turner, Neurochemicals Blamed for Compulsive Gambling, 8 COMPULSIVE GAMBLING 1 (1995-1996) (citing article 
in the UNION-NEWS (Springfield, Mass.), May 10, 1995) (emphasis added). 
16 See Harvard Addictions Meta-Analysis, supra note 12. See, e.g., Mega-Lawsuits, supra note 11, at Tables A1-A4. 
17 SMR RES. CORP., THE PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY CRISIS 1997 (1997) [hereinafter BANKRUPTCY CRISIS]. 
18 Richard I. Aaron, How Much Does the Rise in Gambling Cause a Rise in Bankruptcy?, 7 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 313 
(1998). 
19 For a summary of these costs, see Mega-Lawsuits, supra note 11, at 47, Table A8, & 56-57; U.S. and International Costs, 
supra note 11, Table 8. The 1999 National Gambling Impact Study Commission reported that twenty-three percent of 
pathological gamblers and thirteen percent of problem gamblers had been incarcerated. The thirty-two percent of 
pathological gamblers who had been arrested were each calculated to have a lifetime arrest cost of $10,000. NAT’L 
GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT 7-14 (1999), available at 
http://gov.info.library.unt.edu/ngoc/reports/2.dpf [hereinafter NGISC FINAL REPORT]. 
20 See Mega-Lawsuits, supra note 11, at 47-48, Tables A9-10, 57-60; U.S. and International Costs, supra note 11, at 9-10. 
21 See E. L. Grinols & J. D. Omorov, Development or Dreamfield Delusions? Assessing Casino Gambling’s Costs and 
Benefits, 16 J.L. & COM. 49, 52-65 (1996) [hereinafter Development or Dreamfield Delusions]. 
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As President Clinton summarized in his 1998 IMF address: “Strong government policies, [and] sound 
business practices...are needed to ensure growth into the future.”22 Entertaining recommendations of legalized 
gambling will only lead to minimal short-term benefits in exchange for significant long-term consequences that 
could take years to repair. In the developing and often ailing economies of the Pacific Rim and Russia, for 
example, policymakers should focus on recommendations that bring new economic expansion through “sound 
business practices,” rather than utilize discredited gambling economics to redistribute wealth and create new 
social costs and negative externalities. 
F. The U.S.–International Interface with Gambling 
In 1996, the U.S. Congress passed the National Gambling Impact Study Commission Act23 establishing a 
nine-member commission24 to conduct a comprehensive study of the social and economic impacts of gambling 
in the United States.25 Among other things, Congress was concerned that “the growth of various forms of 
gambling…could affect interstate and international matters under the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Government.”26 Congressional concern stemmed from the rapid expansion in the types of gambling available to 
the U.S. public and from the social costs associated with this expansion. The National Gambling Impact Study 
Commission (NGISC or 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission) concluded that “gambling is not merely a business 
like any other and that it should remain carefully regulated.”27 There was, however, dissent among the 
commissioners as to how much regulation was necessary. Notably, several Commissioners represented the 
gambling industry, but despite the gambling industry’s influence, some of the Commissioners found that the 
evidence weighed so strongly against the gambling industry that it should be prohibited altogether.28 
Notwithstanding the differences of opinion, the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission unanimously agreed that “the 
country has gone very far very fast,”29 there should be “a pause in the expansion of gambling,”30 and it should 
“perhaps even [be] prohibited.”31 
This analysis assesses the potential impact of government-sanctioned gambling and concludes that both 
domestic and international legalized gambling activities constitute international economic policy by default, 
which is inimical to U.S. and international long-term economic/legal stability of expectations, undermining the 
maintenance of a favorable legal order. An economic analysis of legalized gambling shows that because 
gambling activities addict significant proportions of any given population base, it imposes substantial costs on 
society by increasing the incidence of bankruptcy, crime, corruption, and poverty. 
In the United States, tax revenue deriving from the industry has been insufficient to cover the costs it 
imposes on society.32 For each tax dollar generated from legalized gambling during the 1990s, U.S. residents 
incurred three dollars in increased socio-economic costs due to bankruptcy, crime, and corruption.33 The tax rate 
                                                           
22 President William J. Clinton, Message at the International Monetary Fund/World Bank Annual Meeting (Oct. 6, 1998) 
[hereinafter Clinton IMF Speech]. 
23 National Gambling Impact Study Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 104-169, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996), codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 1955 (1994 & Supp. 1998). 
24 Id. § 3(a). 
25 Id. § 4(a)(1). 
26 Id. § 2(3) (emphasis added). 
27 See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 1-7. 
28 See id. at 1-7, App. I (Summary Statement by Comm’r James C. Dobson, Ph.D.). 
29 NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 1-7. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 See generally John W. Kindt, U.S. National Security and the Strategic Economic Base: The Business/Economic Impacts of 
the Legalization of Gambling Activities, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 567 (1995) [hereinafter Strategic Economic Base]. See 
National Gambling Impact & Policy Comm’n Act: Hearing on H.R. 497 before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) [hereinafter Congressional Gambling Hearing 1995]. 
33 John W. Kindt, The Business-Economic Impacts of Licensed Casino Gambling in West Virginia: Short-Term Gain but 
Long-Term Pain, 13 W. VA. U. PUB. AFF. REP. 22 (1996) [hereinafter Business-Economic Impacts of Gambling]. See 
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applied to the industry has not been adjusted to accommodate these built-in costs, making gambling a 
worthwhile investment at the micro-economic level only if significant revenue is “cannibalized” from outside 
the host jurisdiction.34 As the socio-economic costs are inevitable, legalized gambling constitutes inherently 
deleterious macro-economic policy. If legalized gambling is allowed to proliferate, government-sponsored 
gambling destabilizes the global essential of “maintaining a favorable legal and economic order.” This results 
because legalized gambling encourages costly addiction, exacerbating the occurrence of international criminal 
activities and poverty, and further stratifying society. Furthermore, gambling philosophies cannibalize 
entrepreneurial time and business development. 
Statistics demonstrate that any strategic long-term economic plan—for the United States and/or the world 
economy—should not endorse legalized gambling.35 Similar to the hypothetical legalization of prohibited drugs 
and the obvious costs, the high costs associated with legalized gambling are neither easily nor inexpensively 
mitigated. Even if all gambling industry tax revenues were directed at combating the associated increased costs 
in bankruptcies and crime, international societies would continue to bear unnecessary and untenable burdens.36 
In the United States during the mid-1990s, this fact was lost on decision-makers, which was perhaps explained 
in part by the enormous lobbying power of industry proponents.37 
The United States shoulders the international responsibility of structuring its market system to encourage 
economic development and political stability, both domestically and abroad. With regard to gambling, the U.S. 
Congress has only partially met its burden. In acknowledging its jurisdiction over Internet gambling, for 
example, and the concomitant international economic concerns, the U.S. Congress has to some degree shielded 
the U.S. public from the potential destabilizing effect of “international economic cannibalization” via Internet 
gambling. Despite this, the reluctance of the U.S. Congress to provide federal regulation has allowed state 
legislatures to create and perpetuate unsound economic policies impacting the country as a whole. The 
commerce power of the U.S. Congress38 easily extends to most domestic legalized gambling activities. 
Congress should thus reduce the costly transboundary economic raiding between states that accompanies 
legalized gambling by asserting its power over this traditionally state-dominated area. 
Furthermore, U.S. and international policymakers should recognize the destabilizing effect legalized 
gambling will have on segments of the global economy, as well as the entire international economy. Rather than 
institute piecemeal protectionist measures which exacerbate the cannibalistic “us against them” approach often 
prominent in domestic and foreign policy on the issue, policymakers must engage in cooperative efforts to 
ensure the healthy growth of the global economy. In part, this goal would be accomplished through bilateral and 
multilateral treaties involving friendship, commerce, and navigation (FCN treaties) to prohibit international 
transboundary economic raiding via government-sanctioned gambling activities. As an example of one initial 
policy, it should be established that the international populace might “move to the legalized gambling,” but the 
gambling should not be allowed to “move to the gambler” across national boundaries—thus prohibiting Internet 
gambling. 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
generally The National Impact of Casino Gambling Proliferation: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Small Business, 
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter Congressional Gambling Hearing 1994]. 
34 See generally John W. Kindt, Legalized Gambling Activities as Subsidized by Taxpayers, 48 ARK. L. REV. 889 (1995) 
[hereinafter Gambling Subsidized]. 
35 See generally Strategic Economic Base, supra note 32. 
36 See generally Gambling Subsidized, supra note 34. 
37 John W. Kindt, Follow the Money: Gambling, Ethics, and Subpoenas, 556 ANNALS AM. ACADEMY POL. & SOC. SCI. 85, 
85 (1998) [hereinafter Follow the Money]. 




Delimitation of Problems 
A. The U.S. Gambling Landscape 
Once New Hampshire revived the lottery in 1964,39 gambling became more publicly accepted and widespread 
in the United States. As of 1999, thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia operated lotteries, forty-three 
states endorsed pari-mutuel wagering on horse races, fifteen states permitted pari-mutuel wagering on 
greyhound racing, two states allowed sports wagering, and twenty-eight states permitted casino gambling.40 
Gambling also exists legally or illegally in a number of states in the form of “convenience gambling” and 
“electronic gambling devices” (EGDs), such as slot machines, video poker, and video keno. These are often 
placed in public places, such as bars, truck stops, convenience stores, restaurants, and supermarkets. In some 
states, private sector businesses are allowed to operate EGDs, and in other states, EGDs are operated by the 
state lottery. In 1982, U.S. consumers spent $4.2 billion in casinos, and $2.2 billion on lottery tickets.41 By 
1997, these figures had increased to $27 billion and $16.6 billion, respectively.42 By 2000, the gambling 
industry’s combined gross revenues were $61.4 billion.43 There was also growing evidence from experts that for 
every one dollar in new legalized gambling, there were one to two dollars (or more) in new illegal gambling. 44 
While increased legalization and access stimulates the legal gambling market, it also grows an illegal shadow 
market that competes by providing (1) better odds; (2) better credit; (3) better service; and (4) a heightened 
sensation factor.45 
B. The Myth of Gambling as Entertainment: Gambling as a U.S. and International Problem 
According to Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Samuelson,46 it is basic economics that: 
[Gambling] involves simply sterile transfers of money or goods between individuals, creating 
no new money or goods. Although it creates no output, gambling does nevertheless absorb 
time and resources.  When pursued beyond the limits of recreation, where the main purpose 
after all is to “kill” time, gambling subtracts from the national income.47 
Proponents of the gambling industry argue that gambling is just another form of entertainment—like 
playing a round of golf, watching a movie, or going to an opera—and as such should be subject to similar 
regulatory standards. Critics of the gambling industry claim that gambling is more analogous to illicit drug use 
than to acceptable forms of national entertainment for one reason in particular—gambling, like illicit drug use, 
imposes enormous costs on society which are not similarly imposed by the entertainment industry. Although 
many countries have experienced the destabilizing influence of government-sponsored gambling, only two 
                                                           
39 For a brief history of gambling in the United States, see NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at ch. 2. 
40 NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 2-1 to 2-15. 
41 Erika Gosker, Note, The Marketing of Gambling to the Elderly, 7 ELDER L.J. 185, 187 (1999); Patricia Edmonds, 
Gambling's Backers Find It Isn’t a Sure Bet, USA TODAY, Dec. 29, 1995, at Al. 
42 Gosker, supra note 41, at 187; Edmonds, supra note 41, at Al. 
43 Gross Annual, supra note 10, at 32. 
44 Statement and Testimony of William G. Hall, Exec. Dir. Ill. Econ. & Fiscal Comm’n, before the Ill. Legislative Gambling 
Task Force, Springfield, Ill., July 20, 1996; see Statement of William G. Hall, Exec. Dir., Edward Boss, Chief Econ., Ill. 
Econ. & Fiscal Comm’n, Gambling in Illinois: Its History, Revenue, and Future Trends, presented to the Ill. Legislative 
Gambling Task Force, Springfield, Ill., July 20, 1996. Gambling critics indicated that the series of socio-economic negatives 
reported in the seriatim 1996 hearings of the Illinois Legislative Task Force on Gambling were so embarrassing to gambling 
proponents that those public hearings were never printed for dissemination to the public and press. 
45 Congressional Gambling Hearing 1995, supra note 32, at 60-98. 
46 Paul Samuelson won the Nobel Prize in Economic Science in 1970. 
47 PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 425 (10th ed. 1976) (emphasis added). 
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countries have in some measure quantified its costs: the United States and Australia. As Professor Earl Grinols48 
summarized the basic economic principle: “[t]hese  costs are quite high and quite real.”49 
1.  Government-Sponsored Gambling as Creating New Pathological (Addicted) and Problem Gamblers, New 
Bankruptcies, New Crime, and New Corruption 
a. Addiction 
It is significant to reiterate that as Associate Professor Howard Shaffer of the Harvard Division on Addictions 
has concluded: “Gambling is an addictive behavior, make no mistake about it…. Gambling has all the 
properties of a psychoactive substance, and again, the reason is that it changes the neurochemistry of the 
brain.”50 According to Henry Lesieur, Professor Emeritus and President of the Institute on Problem Gambling, 
between five and six percent of the U.S. population has a gambling problem.51 This classification includes both 
“pathological” and “problem” gamblers. Pathological gambling is recognized in the APA’s Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders52 as a type of addictive behavior.53 The APA describes the essential 
feature of pathological gambling as “the persistent and maladaptive gambling behavior that disrupts personal, 
family, or vocational pursuits.”54 According to the APA, a pathological gambler: 
May be preoccupied with gambling (e.g., reliving past gambling experiences, planning the 
next gambling venture, or thinking of ways to get money with which to gamble. Most 
[pathological gamblers] say that they are seeking “action” (an aroused, euphoric state) even 
more than money. Increasingly larger bets, or greater risks, may be needed to continue to 
produce the desired level of excitement. [Pathological gamblers] often continue to gamble 
despite repeated efforts to control, cut back, or stop the behavior.... A pattern of “chasing” 
one’s losses may develop, with an urgent need to keep gambling (often with larger bets or the 
taking of greater risks) to undo a loss or series of losses.... The individual may lie to family 
members, therapists, or others to conceal the extent of involvement with gambling. When the 
individual’s borrowing resources are strained, the person may resort to antisocial behavior 
(e.g., forgery, fraud, theft, or embezzlement) to obtain money.55 
A study financed by the gambling industry itself showed that one-half percent,56 or 1.5 million people57 of 
the U.S. population, became new pathological gamblers between 1994 and 1997, and that two percent of the 
U.S. population,58 or 3.5 million people, became new problem gamblers during the same period.59 Statistics 
                                                           
48 Earl Grinols is a Professor of Economics at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
49 Earl L. Grinols, Gambling as Economic Policy: Enumerating Why Losses Exceed Gains, ILL. Bus. Rev. 6 (1995). 
50 Turner, supra note 15, at 1. 
51 M. Neil Browne, The Role of Ethics in Regulatory Discourse: Can Market Failure Justify the Regulation of Casino 
Gaming?, 6 NEB. L. REV. 37, 48 (1999).  
52 DSM-IV, supra note 13, at 615-18. 
53 Technically, pathological gambling was classified as an impulse control disorder, but until gambling-industry research 
monies intervened, the academic trend was toward classifying pathological gambling as an addiction. Compare Turner, 
supra note 15, at 1, with David Ferrell & Matea Gold, Casino Industry Fights an Emerging Backlash, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 
1998, at Al. 
54 DSM-IV, supra note 13, at 278. 
55 Id. at 278-79. 
56 Harvard Addictions Meta-Analysis, supra note 12, at 43, Table 13. 
57 Multiplying the prevalence percentage for 1997 with the yearly population number from the U.S. Bureau of the Census 
yields 3.5 million for an increase of 1.3 million new pathological gamblers. However, the Harvard Addictions 
Meta-Analysis concludes that there were 4.4 million pathological gamblers in 1997, which would yield 1.3 million to 2.2 
million new pathological gamblers. Since the Harvard Addictions Meta-Analysis did not include its calculations, 1.5 million 
new pathological gamblers is a conservative figure. Harvard Addictions Meta-Analysis, supra note 12, at 41, Table 13 & 51, 
Table 16. 
58 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
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show that the comparable pathological and problem gambling rates among teens were double those of the U.S. 
adult population,60 and furthermore, the elderly were particularly vulnerable to the lures of gambling.61 
Considering that these results were revealed often by industry-financed studies, these numbers were particularly 
alarming. 
b. Bankruptcy 
A conservative estimate shows that between 1994 and 1997, approximately twenty percent of new pathological 
gamblers in the United States filed for personal bankruptcy,62 at an average cost of $29,650.63 The total cost to 
society64 of these new bankruptcies conservatively totaled $9 billion.65 Problem gamblers suffered much the 
same fate as pathological gamblers. Between 1994 and 1997, the bankruptcies of problem gamblers cost society 
approximately $30 billion.66 Taken together, the United States absorbed approximately $40 billion in new 
bankruptcy costs from 1994 to 1997 directly attributable to the legalization of gambling.67 
c. Crime Costs of Pathological (Addicted) and Problem Gamblers 
The speed with which legalized gambling spread throughout the United States in the 1990s, and the limited 
sources of funding available to study its impact prevented the production of many necessary impact studies. 
Despite a dearth of crime statistics, authoritative information suggests that the incidence of gambling-related 
crime is substantial. In its analysis of the economic and social cost impact of gambling, a comprehensive 1994 
report by the Florida Governor’s Office established a correlation between the legalization of casinos and the 
crime costs to society. Specifically, the report found that each new pathological gambler costs a state $1,624 for 
probation related expenses, $858 for community control related expenses, $19,987 in incarceration related 
expenses, and $363 in post-secondary release supervision related expenses.68 
According to the Compulsive Gambling Center in Baltimore, Maryland, virtually all pathological gamblers 
commit crimes, but generally seventy-five percent of pathological gamblers are not caught or the criminal 
charges are dropped.69 Some gamblers steal—from employers, insurance companies, family members, and close 
associates—to repay their debts or to feed their gambling habits.70 Other gamblers resort to prostitution or drug 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
59 Multiplying the prevalence percentage for 1997 with the yearly population number from the U.S. Bureau of the Census 
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cause of bankruptcies; (2) was the fastest growing cause; (3) carried a hidden cost per household of $408; and (4) carried a 
U.S. total of $40 billion a year). 
67 Id. 
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69 Interview with Dr. Valerie Lorenz, Exec. Dir., Compulsive Gambling Ctr., Inc., Baltimore, Md. (Dec. 10, 1992). See, e.g., 
Mega-Lawsuits, supra note 11, at 46-47, Tables A6-8,56-57. 
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dealing.71 In an extreme example of what criminal acts can follow from gambling addiction, one Illinois mother 
allegedly killed her two children in separate incidents and was imprisoned for trying to collect $200,000 of their 
insurance money so she could continue to gamble.72 
Two-thirds of pathological gambling debtors contemplate suicide.73 For example, the coroner’s office 
linked several suicides in the Joliet, Illinois area to losses suffered at local casinos, including a husband-wife 
double suicide.74 Such a scenario can develop quickly, as exemplified by a long-time police officer whose 
accumulated gambling losses led him to commit suicide in a Detroit casino shortly after it opened in 1999.75 
By 2000, the economic and social disruption in the United States caused by pathological and problem 
gambling was extensive. Extrapolated to the entire community of potential new pathological gamblers in the 
United States, the unadjusted (and thus more conservative) cost in 1997 with respect to identified expenses 
totaled approximately $34.2 billion.76 When these statistical trends were extrapolated to any potentially 
saturated gambling economy, particularly in developing countries, these statistics suggested significant social 
disruption. 
d. Organized Crime 
Gambling has traditionally been associated with organized criminal activities,77 but stringent industry regulation 
in the United States has largely discouraged, although not eliminated, organized crime influences. However, 
other countries without substantial and stronger law enforcement mechanisms have not managed to curb such 
abuses. For example, historically, legalized gambling venues were rife with money laundering activities often 
linked to organized crime.78 If the stringent U.S. law enforcement mechanisms have not eliminated all 
influences from organized crime, a fortiori, the governmental authorities and economies of those countries 
lacking efficient law enforcement infrastructures are at significant risk. In his statement before the U.S. 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Russian General Mikhail Yegerov cited gambling as one of the 
interests (along with money laundering, illegal money transactions, prostitution, and drug related industries) of 
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the twenty-four Russian organized crime groups operating in the United States.79 Furthermore, there is growing 
evidence that for every dollar in new legalized gambling activities, there are at least one to two dollars in new 
illegal gambling,80 paving the way for increased avenues of operation for the type of international organized 
crime groups described by General Yegerov. 
2. Why Governments Legalize Gambling 
a. Illusory Promises 
Historically, gambling representatives repeatedly described gambling as a tool for economic development that 
created new jobs for depressed regional economies81 and proponents of gambling argued for its legalization by 
promising new tax revenues for various government units struggling to find funding.82 Studies demonstrated 
that these promises were generally illusory promises.83 A basic concept usually ignored in gambling-financed 
studies was the utilization of valid “before and after” data, because such studies almost invariably reflected 
unfavorably on gambling activities. 
Accordingly, a 1996 analysis of Illinois’ employment statistics taken before and after the widespread 
legalization of casino gambling confirmed that little, if any, growth was directly attributable to the new 
industry.84 Because gambling transferred “money from one local pocket to another and from one local sector to 
another [gambling did] ... not lead to a net increase in regional demand.”85 A given area could realize growth 
only when it attracted buyers from outside the area, thus enlarging the local economy.86 Secondly, assuming that 
a gambling establishment did attract buyers from outside the area, usually designated as the thirty-five-mile or 
100-mile “feeder markets,” the host area would subsequently realize growth only if the revenue generated from 
the outside buyers was spent in the host jurisdiction.87 Thirdly, a host area would realize net employment 
growth only when the gambling establishment’s employees lived in the host area at the time legalization was 
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considered and then continued to do so.88 The minimal employment effect in Illinois suggested that one or more 
of these requirements were not met in most situations89 and that the promises made by the industry fell far short 
of meeting expectations. Even if all of the positive factors were present and the host area realized economic 
development from the presence of legalized gambling, it was usually in the temporary form of a “boom and 
bust” cycle. 
The “boom and bust” phenomenon is due largely to the “cannibalistic” nature of gambling. Since the 
gambling industry is not taxed sufficiently to cover the social costs it imposes on society,90 a gambling economy 
is not economically beneficial to a local area unless it can draw sufficient revenue from bettors outside the tax 
jurisdiction to counter the social costs inherent in gambling activities. Neighboring “feeder market” jurisdictions 
are thereby pressured to reclaim their lost revenue base, legalize gambling, and begin a race to the bottom that 
often leads to economic failure. These failures: 
Underscore the economic cannibalism that looms ahead as casinos proliferate. Casinos thrive 
as long as they lure out of towners. But once the wagering visitors get their own casino back 
home, the locals tend to be left holding the bag. This boom and bust pattern is pandemic, 
reports William R. Eadington, an economist, who heads the University of Nevada’s Institute 
for the Study of Gambling and Commercial Gaming in Reno. In place after place, he says, a 
casino-based economy first soars but then slumps into a black hole.91 
The town of Gardena, California constituted a microcosmic example of this phenomenon. In the mid-20th 
century, Gardena, California brought in more money from gambling than any other city in the state.92 Tax 
revenue from its six prosperous card rooms financed “virtually every aspect of the city's operations, from its 
police to its parks.”93 When California passed Proposition 13—a “tax-limitation initiative that sank many towns 
into debt”94—many cities turned to poker clubs to make up for lost revenues,95 usurping Gardena’s virtual 
monopoly over local card clubs. By 1998, there was only one card room left in Gardena, and more importantly, 
storefronts were closed with no major shopping centers or fine restaurants left anywhere in the city.96 Tom 
Parks, who ran two of the card clubs, noted, “A lot of surrounding businesses...are gone now.”97 There was 
insufficient diversity in Gardena’s economic base to allow it to withstand the loss of poker room revenue.98 As 
Richard K. Propster, the former police chief in Gardena, summarized, “There were stories for years about Sears 
Roebuck...looking for a site in this area and not choosing Gardena at least partially because [of the card 
rooms].”99 Tom Parks described the psychological impact of this boom and bust phenomenon: “I don’t think 
people really realized how dependent they were on the [card] clubs until they started closing up.”100 In an 
economic irony reminiscent of the Twilight Zone, by 1998 Gardena appeared doomed to repeat and intensify 
this same tragic scenario. In 1998, Gardena was millions of dollars in debt and looking to a proposal by Larry 
Flint, the avant-garde magazine mogul, to build a two-story, $30-million card room with a companion sports bar 
and restaurant.101 
                                                           
88 See generally, Development or Dreamfield Delusions, supra note 21, at 49. 
89 Id. 
90 See generally, Gambling Subsidized, supra note 34; Development or Dreamfield Delusions, supra note 21, at 49; U.S. and 
International Costs, supra note 11. 
91 Hellman, Casino Craze, TRAVEL HOLIDAY, Mar. 1994, at 86 (citing to Prof. William Eadington, U. Nev.-Reno) (emphasis 
added). 
92 David Ferrell, Gardena’s Changing Fortunes; Living by Casinos, Losing by Casinos, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1998, at A6. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. See also, Ferrell & Gold, supra note 53, at Al. 





101 Ferrell, supra note 92. 
Destructive Economic Policies in the Age of Terrorism 13 
 
b. Industry Pressure and Political Influence 
Industry potential for economic reward is enormous. Arguably, the enormous profit margins inherent in 
legalized gambling activities can be attributable to gambling’s addictive character. A disproportionate 
percentage of the gambling industry’s revenue comes from pathological and problem gamblers whose 
“entertainment” transforms to compromise and eventually destroy their economic and social stability. Despite 
the extent to which society at large is financially burdened by legalized gambling, decisionmakers mistakenly 
afford the industry the luxury of avoiding internalizing the costs of gambling’s negative externalities and of 
operating under the same tax structure as less costly industries. Furthermore, legalized gambling is inherently 
monopolistic with regard to the rest of the economy. “Because the nature of gambling requires government 
oversight and restriction (the limitation of competition), it is an industry that offers artificially high profits for 
the few fortunate enough to be licensed.”102 For example, one Illinois riverboat resulted in a reported tripling of 
the original $7 million investment after the casino was in business for only six months.103 Professor Grinols 
observed that “[t]his kind of profit drives others to seek to expand gambling for their own profit.”104 
The success of industry expansion efforts in the United States has derived from “the extraordinary amount 
of money…legally used to overwhelm any opposition”105 in both the political and the academic arenas. One 
way in which the gambling industry used its economic strength to overwhelm its competitors was by 
subsidizing its own body of data that was effectively unreviewable by the larger academic community.106 As 
noted expert Professor Henry Lesieur concluded, “research funded by the industry [was]...going to dominate the 
dialogue”107 for the early years of the 21st century. 
Another equally problematic aspect of casino-interest money could be found in its lobbying power. 
Pro-gambling interests became the 1990s’ single most powerful lobbying group in many individual state 
legislatures.108 In Illinois, for example, one casino company offered $20 million to two political insiders to help 
secure a casino license.109 In 1995 in Virginia—a state with only some charitable gambling and a recently 
enacted lottery—casino proponents hired forty-eight lobbyists, who represented practically every lobbying firm 
in Richmond, in an attempt to prohibit any anti-gambling lobbyists from competing. The pro-casino interests 
then spent between $820,000 and $1.1 million during a forty-five-day legislative session in a failed attempt to 
legalize riverboat casinos.110 As reported by the Center for Responsive Politics and the National Coalition 
Against Legalized Gambling (NCALG), data released by the Federal Election Commission revealed that by the 
end of the 1996 election cycle, contributions to federal candidates totaled $5.4 million, including $3.6 million in 
soft money. This was a 700% increase over the $457,600 contributed in 1991–92.111 Interestingly, both the 
Democrats and the Republicans were receiving similarly large amounts from the gambling industry,112 although 
sometimes from different gambling industry constituencies. 
In congressional hearings before the U.S. Committee on the Judiciary, Representative Frank R. Wolf 
voiced his concern “that the flood of casino money into the states...[would] drown out the voices of ordinary 
citizens, and overwhelm state public officials.”113 Incidents in various states suggested that these concerns were 
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well-founded.114 In 1998, in California alone, gambling proponents contributed over $100 million to 
pro-gambling campaigns and political interests.115 A review of parallel problems in several states has disclosed 
a pattern of gambling industry abuses of the political process. 
i. Iowa 
In Waterloo, Iowa, voters rejected casino gambling on May 17, 1994. The gambling interests were powerful 
enough that the issue was placed on the ballot again only four months later on September 27, 1994.116 The 
gambling industry spent $40 for each dollar spent by its opponents, yet the initiative failed.117 
ii. Florida 
In 1994, the gambling industry spent over $16.5 million, approximately $10 for each dollar spent by its 
opponents, in their attempt to convince Florida voters to open their $32 billion tourist market to the casino 
industry.118 This $16.5 million was more than the combined totals spent in the 1994 gubernatorial campaigns of 
then Governor Lawton Chiles and future Governor Jeb Bush. Florida voters voted against casino gambling in 
1994, this time by a margin of over two-to-one.119 
iii. Missouri 
In Missouri, pro-gambling forces were able to place the issue on the ballot in November of 1994—only a few 
months after Missourians had voted against casino gambling in April. By increasing its November 
pro-gambling campaign expenditures to $10 million, a ratio of $78-to-$1 (almost doubling its expenditures from 
the April election), the pro-gambling interests won.120 
Nat Helms, a former high-ranking member of the gambling industry’s 1994 campaign to bring video 
gambling machines to Missouri, emphasized the “buy the opposition” strategy of pro-gambling interests: 
“Because of the unlimited money it generates, gambling also generates unlimited potential for abuse….I have 
never met anybody who could resist a full-court press by the gambling industry.”121 
iv. Arkansas 
In 2000, Arkansas was faced with Amendment 5, a proposed constitutional amendment that would grant 
permission for casinos to be built in six Arkansas counties122 despite the defeat of a similar 1995 proposal. 
Although a poll showed that fifty-one percent of the public in 2000 was against Amendment 5, Democratic 
Party and pro-gambling operative Glen Hooks stated: “I intend to run an intensive media campaign and an 
extensive grassroots campaign over the next 32 days .... We’re going to be at every festival, at every block 
party, on the air with TV and radio.”123 
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On the national level, gambling opponents posited that as early as 1996, the formation of the National 
Gambling Impact Study Commission was subjected to the beginnings of similar pressures when the American 
Gaming Association spent $860,000 on federal lobbying. 124 
3. International Case Examples of Gambling Economies 
a. Public Understanding of Gambling Impacts by Visualizing the “Island Economy” 
For the public to understand the cost/benefit impacts of a gambling economy, it is often helpful to visualize 
casino gambling at the center of a thirty-five-mile radius designated the “thirty-five-mile feeder market.” 
Visualizing an island with a limited radius which introduces casino gambling to the center of its island economy 
further simplifies the understanding that casino gambling merely cannibalizes its own citizens—even when 
island visitors can be enticed to bypass the water boundaries surrounding the island. In 2001, it was postulated 
that Hawaii, for example, would serve as a good “before-and-after” economic “petri dish” if legalized gambling 
was ever introduced to the Honolulu area. However, policymakers in Hawaii, and non-island economies as well, 
would be better served to examine the impacts of legal and illegal gambling on the island of Macau. 
b. Macau: The Practical Example of the “Island Economy” 
 
LIGHT DRAWS MOSQUITOES, CASINOS DRAW TRIADS125 
One by one, the judge read out their names and verdicts. Fat Woman. Scarface. Queen of 
Smuggling. And the notorious Broken Tooth, sentenced to 15 years as the boss of the 14K 
triad. As part of a 10,000-strong underground society, these characters lorded over this 
territory for years, presiding over its nine casinos and engaging in crimes such as money 
laundering, loan sharking, and drug smuggling.126 
 
This is some of the 1999 news from Macau, a small picturesque island off the coast of mainland China. It 
encompasses a mere nine and one-fifth miles and has a population of less than half a million. The island is best 
known for its casino industry headed by Stanley Ho, who was granted a monopoly license over the industry in 
1962.127 His license was scheduled to expire on December 31, 2001.128 
As a small island with little economic diversity, Macau exemplifies a type of “economic petri dish” for 
analyzing and visualizing the socioeconomic impacts of gambling activities. In 1996, gambling accounted for 
approximately thirty percent of Macau’s gross domestic product, and gambling taxes accounted for about half 
of Macau’s total government revenues. The island is governed by corruption and crime. By 1998, with profits 
waning in the face of competition from gambling resorts in South Korea, the Philippines, and Malaysia, and 
with the pending expiration of Stanley Ho’s license, gang factions began jockeying for control over Macau’s 
gambling industry.129 In 1998, there were thirty-seven people killed in mostly gang-related homicides. The list 
of those killed in Macau since 1996 included the gambling inspector, the marine police chief, the chauffeur for 
the undersecretary of security, and members of the 14K gang who were hacked to death by hit men for the rival 
Rolex gang.130 The list of those targeted but not killed on the island in the same period included Police Chief 
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Antonio Batista, whose car was blown up, and five police officers.131 The bomb that injured the five police 
officers also injured ten journalists.132 
The island obviously suffers from a lack of regulatory oversight. No measures were in place to stop the 
transfer when Zhang Xiaoming, former manager of a state-owned Chinese company, funneled $850,000 in 
public funds through a Macau trading company and into the Macau branch of the Bank of China. Within five 
months, he lost all the money gambling in Macau’s casinos. He was executed in 1991.133 Joao Severino, then 
editor of the territory’s Portuguese-language daily, stated that “the administration has lost control, and the triad 
knows it.”134 Macau legislator Antonio Ng confirmed this conclusion and stated “we cannot control the situation 
because our policemen are still influenced by criminal members.”135 
c. Australia 
Australia has the highest per capita incidence of gambling in the world, with more than eighty percent of its 
population placing bets.136 With at least one casino in every major city, by 1999 Australia’s gambling market 
was virtually saturated.137 In 1999, the Australian government released a report from the Productivity 
Commission Inquiry regarding the Study of the Gambling Industry.138 The findings included in the report 
emphasized the enormity of the problems Australia faced because of its government’s commitments to the 
legalized gambling industry. 
Approximately one percent of the Australian population were delimited as having “severe” problems with 
gambling,139 while another two and one-tenth percent of the population had “significant” problems with 
gambling,140 and yet another six and three-tenth percent of the population had some problem with gambling.141 
Of the total Australian problem gamblers, it was estimated that approximately fifty percent committed criminal 
offenses to support their gambling.142 In Australia, problem gamblers accounted for fifteen percent of regular 
gamblers, and contributed between thirty-five and thirty-nine percent of all gambling revenue.143 The annual 
losses for a problem gambler averaged $12,000, and between seven and eight (7.3) people were adversely 
affected by each problem gambler.144 Children whose parents had a problem with gambling were more likely to 
develop problems themselves,145 and the most immediate concern for children’s welfare in problem gambling 
households was poverty and the resulting deprivation of life’s essentials, including food.146 By 1999, 
Australians were losing $7.25 billion a year to gambling, nearly twice the amount they spent on power and fuel 
combined.147 
The report found that approximately seventy percent of Australians consider that gambling does more harm 
than good to the community.148 Reacting to the Productivity Commission’s findings, Prime Minister John 
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Howard said: “[T]his is an achievement of which I am ashamed .... I would like the federal and state 
governments to get together and see if there aren’t intelligent things we can do to curb the abuse.”149 Despite the 
known hazards of gambling, and in the wake of the Productivity Commission’s report, Australian authorities 
continued to expand casino capacity,150 a government-addicted trend, which further destabilized the long-term 
Australian economy with economic ripple effects, poised to injure other countries invested in the Australian 
economy. 
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Clarification of Goals 
A. Strategic Economic Goals and the U.N. System 
Political-economic history demonstrates that any industry or combination of industries powerful enough to 
dominate an economy and the government’s economic policies will destabilize that economy to promote the 
industry itself and thereby usually precipitate a boom and bust phenomenon.151 Economic history, as well as 
basic statistics, suggest that because of inflated profit margins, coupled with its sterile need for continued 
expansion, the gambling industry is powerful enough to effect such eventual destabilization in any national 
economy. Indeed, academic research suggests that legalized gambling can easily catalyze the collapse of the 
economies of less-developed countries—due in part to their lack of safeguards and infrastructure.152 The 
economic experiences of Gardena, California and Macau provide microcosmic examples of this destructive 
process. 
The overall strategic goals for government should be to conform to the common law principle of 
maximizing “the public health, safety, and welfare” of its citizens, and to forge a common vision of 
international cooperation in the interest of the global good. The U.S. obligation to the United Nations (U.N.) 
exemplifies its commitment to this end. Article 55 of the U.N. Charter reads: 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well being, which are necessary for 
peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: 
[H]igher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress 
and development; solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; 
and international cultural and educational cooperation.…153 
B. International Economic Goals and the World Bank Group 
In the 1970s, the World Bank Group’s policies involving the granting of loans began to be influenced by 
externalities other than just financial considerations. Specifically, attention was directed to the environmental 
impacts created by development projects underwritten by the World Bank Group.154 
The World Bank Group consisted of the World Bank (Bank) itself, formally designated as the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and its two affiliates, the International Development 
Association (IDA) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC).155 Parallel with the establishment of the 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF),156 the World Bank Group was created during the 1944 Bretton Woods 
Conference to address the international financial problems incident to World War II and its aftermath. The 
purpose of the IMF was to finance temporary balance-of-payments deficits, while the Bank was to provide 
long-term finance for the reconstruction of economies damaged by the war and for the development of the less 
developed countries (LDCs). Thus, the IMF dealt with problems of international liquidity and short-term credit, 
while the Bank handled the flow of long-term capital for investment purposes across national boundaries. 
Initially, the Bank’s lending policy was governed by two conditions. The loan had to be for a specific 
project, and the Bank could only finance the foreign exchange component of the project. The Bank’s charter 
specified that loans had to be: (a) made for specific projects (except in “special circumstances”); (b) made for 
productive purposes; (c) guaranteed by the government concerned; (d) granted without prejudice as to country; 
(e) made only if there exist reasonable prospects for repayment; and (f) granted only if there is no other 
available source.157 
However, by the 1970s, the Bank had liberalized its project approach and began funding many different 
types of stabilization programs within the LDCs. The delegates at Bretton Woods initially envisioned the Bank 
as operating mainly to guarantee loans by private investors, rather than making direct loans from its own 
capital.158 However, from the outset the Bank has emphasized its other purposes, as stated in its Articles of 
Agreement, “to supplement private investment by providing on suitable conditions finance for productive 
purposes out of its own capital, funds raised by it, and other resources.”159 By the 1970s, the Bank was making 
loans to the LDCs in the areas of agriculture, industry, and transportation. 
Since the Bank’s major resources for lending came from private capital markets, it had to fix its terms 
accordingly.160 Consequently, the IDA was founded in 1961161 “to provide development financing to less 
developed countries on terms more flexible and bearing less heavily on their balance of payments than those of 
the World Bank.…”162 Only members of the World Bank could join the IDA; consequently, all members of the 
IDA were members of the Bank. Unlike the Bank, the IDA received virtually all its funds in the form of 
contributions.163 
By lending to governments, the IBRD and the IDA were the main avenues for channeling development 
capital to the LDCs; however, the IFC also contributed by mobilizing private investment. Under a provision of 
the Bank’s charter, loans made by the Bank, if not made to governments, required a government guarantee, and 
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this limited the extent to which the Bank could work with the private sector. Therefore, the IFC was established 
in 1956 to supplement the Bank’s activities by providing risk capital and financing projects in the private sector 
without government guarantees.164 
In this context, the World Bank Group began in the 1970s to incorporate externalities, such as 
environmental issues, into its loan policies. Specifically, the World Bank established an Office of 
Environmental Affairs in 1970.165 This Office reviewed loan applications from the LDCs and decided whether 
or not the project adequately provided for environmental safeguards.166 The Office established guidelines for 
projects in the areas of agriculture, industry, transportation, utilities, and public health.167 This was a significant 
procedural development for the World Bank decision-making process. However, during the 1980s, the World 
Bank’s decision-making image suffered when, for example, it became apparent that much of the Brazilian 
deforestation problems could be linked to World Bank loans. Regardless of these shortcomings in 
environmental decision-making, it seemed that these public policy trends provided significant precedent for the 
World Bank to focus on the “gambling policies” of LDCs before granting loans. 
Recognizing the potential “domino effect” of economic-financial instability in any country, the United 
States and the World Bank community have spent billions of dollars in loans to support countries with 
economic-financial instabilities. It is incongruous to spend billions to stabilize a country economically and then 
allow that country to use those monies to destabilize itself by investing in casinos, and inviting U.S. casino 
companies to build in their jurisdictions. For example, U.S. and World Bank funds were used to stabilize 
Mexico’s faltering economy during the mid-1990s. After receiving those funds, one of Mexico’s prime 
economic so-called “development” strategies was to emulate U.S. gambling policy and invite U.S. casinos to 
Mexico City. From May 13-14, 1996, Mexico City was the site of the Mexico Gaming Summit and Conference 
hosted by representatives of several major U.S. gambling companies and designed obviously to influence the 
Tourist Commission of the Mexican Department of Commerce.168 The Mexico Gaming Summit was advertised 
as a joint venture between the U.S. gambling industry’s trade magazine, International Gaming and Wagering 
Business, and Mexico Business magazine which was billed ironically as “the leading magazine of the NAFTA 
marketplace.”169 However, the policies of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)170 were 
designed to promote and grow commerce via free trade, whereas gambling policies act in contravention of free 
trade and promote sterile transfers of wealth that denigrate, destabilize, and corrupt the Mexican economy and 
its government. 
Perhaps ironically, in March 2002, the U.N. Summit on Global Development was convened in Monterrey, 
Mexico and “compelled the leaders of the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, [the European Union], 
and the International Monetary Fund, gathered together for the first time, to address the poor in terms rarely 
associated with high finance.”171 President George W. Bush, his administration, “and most of the Monterrey 
conferees agree[d] that increased development aid should flow only to deserving nations that... [would] spend 
                                                           
164 World Bank to the Developing Countries, supra note 154, at 551. 
165 Id. at 544. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Advertising Supplement, INT’L GAMING & WAGERING BUS., Apr. 1996. 
169 Id. 
170 Oct. 7, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) & 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993). See generally Earl H. Fry, The North 
American Free Trade Agreement: US. and Canadian Perspectives, in IMPLICATIONS OF A NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE 
REGION 17, 18, 29 (Joseph A. McKinney & M. Rebecca Sharpless eds., 1992); GEORGE W. GRAYSON, THE NORTH 
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT REGIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 178, 179, 182 (Kenneth W. 
Thompson ed., Univ. Press Am. 1995); M. Jean Anderson, Implications of NAFTA’s Extensions to Chile and Other 
Countries—A US. View, 23 CANADA-UNITED STATES L. J. 227 (1997). 
171 Tim Weiner, More Entreaties in Monterrey for More Aid to the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2002, at A10. 
22 John Warren Kindt and Anne E.C. Brynn 
the aid wisely.”172 As U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan summarized: “There is no use... in underwriting 
corrupt regimes ‘built on sand.’”173 
As this analysis shows, legalized gambling creates economic-financial instabilities, creating more demands 
for international relief funds to address emergency situations. Furthermore, funding jurisdictions that sanction 
legalized gambling would be, in most circumstances, futile attempts at stabilization. Legalized gambling is 
simply contrary to sound international monetary policy because of its destabilizing effects.174 
The United States is implicated in this global dilemma precisely because of its economic power. The spread 
of U.S. legalized gambling first precipitated and then promoted the acceptance of legalized gambling activities 
by other countries, and the United States has developed a substantial export market for gambling technology 
and related services. For example, as of 1998, G-Tech (Gambling-Technology), a U.S. company founded in 
1981, controlled seventy percent of the worldwide lottery market, running lotteries in twenty-nine of the 
thirty-eight U.S. states with lotteries, as well as Great Britain and other places.175 Unlike other organizations, it 
appeared that gambling organizations were more often stigmatized by scandals and allegations of corruption. In 
one well-known instance, a London jury found that the founder of G-Tech committed libel when he denied that 
he had tried to bribe a competitor into not challenging his bid for Britain’s lottery business.176 
The United States sets the global standards for gambling. In permitting gambling enterprises to flourish in 
the United States and abroad, the United States undermines global socio-economic stability in contravention of 
its international obligations. By virtue of both its position as world economic leader and its commitment to 
international relief organizations, the United States bears the burden of structuring its economy to reflect the 
goals of international stability and world order.177 As President Clinton stated in his 1998 IMF address, “Strong 
government policies [and] sound business practices... are needed to ensure growth into the future.”178 Promoting 
gambling activities both in the United States and abroad stands in direct conflict with these stated goals.
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Arguably, gambling activities match the classic historical example of an economic process that transfers wealth 
so rapidly and has such a destabilizing potential that governments have suppressed and criminalized most 
gambling activities. While the “boom and bust” economic cycles created by legalized gambling activities 
appear throughout economic history, two of the most recent U.S. cycles occurred during the 19th century.179 
At the beginning of the 1800s, the United States had already interfaced its economic base with the 
gambling philosophy—primarily via lotteries.180 While scandals provided a focus for gambling opponents,181 
these opponents had their positions bolstered by the socio-economic negatives that necessarily accompany 
legalized gambling activities. In most historical scenarios, these business/economic negatives were reflected in 
a decrease in the quality of life, which translated into a net loss of jobs, the creation of large social problems, 
and the necessary increase in various taxes to address these problems.182 Accordingly, most legalized gambling 
activities were re-criminalized in the 1820s and 1830s.183 After the U.S. Civil War, gambling activities once 
again became fashionable and followed the expanding frontier.184 However, the same socio-economic problems 
occurred and, with recurring scandals as catalysts, virtually all gambling activities were re-criminalized by 
1910. 
On February 11, 1998, Turkey re-criminalized gambling only 18 years after it was made legal, in spite of 
the fact that the casinos employed 17,000 people and accounted for nearly one-third of Turkey’s tourist 
revenue.185 Government officials closed the casinos because they were convinced that “the gambling halls were 
a hotbed of money-launderers, tax evaders, and mobsters.”186 The problems were so severe that the Turkish 
government closed the casinos even though it was potentially liable to casino investors for their losses.187 
Despite intense lobbying by U.S. gambling interests, India similarly eliminated its lottery in 1997 because it 
made “poor people poorer” and created new and more socio-economic problems. Further re-criminalization of 
gambling activities can be anticipated as countries look to long-term economic policies for stable growth. 
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Trends and Conditioning Factors 
A. International Land-Based Casinos as Economic Cannibalization 
Despite its substantial social costs, gambling was being promoted globally as a revenue generating mechanism 
throughout the 1990s. By 1999, North Korea was trying to cure decades of mismanagement by piggybacking on 
the high-profit gambling industry.188 The Hong Kong based Emperor Group invested in the $180 million 
Seaview Casino Hotel located in the Rajin-Sonbong area of North Korea.189 “We’re targeting the rich Chinese, 
but there aren’t plenty [sic] around now,” said Mr. Wong, an executive at the Emperor Group.190 In an effort to 
mitigate losses and recognizing the inherent destructive nature of gambling, the North Korean government 
prohibited North Koreans from patronizing the casino.191 
In Cambodia, officials closed down the two licensed casinos in Phnom Penh in 1999, after police 
established that gambling debts motivated most robberies, murders, and kidnappings in the city.192 Rather than 
substantially rid itself of the blight of gambling-induced social problems, the Cambodian government opted to 
move the gambling operations to the Thai-Cambodian border.193 
Also in 1999, the West Bank town of Jericho—whose predominantly Muslim population is opposed to 
gambling on religious grounds—was enjoying newfound casino riches.194 In 1998, the $50 million Oasis Casino 
Resort opened, drawing Israelis and foreign tourists back to the forgotten town, and infusing $1 million a month 
into the local economy.195 By the turn of the century, there was no available statistical data to show the 
repercussions on surrounding areas, but Jericho appeared to be still experiencing the “boom” phase of 
gambling’s economic cycle. 
B. Internet Economic Cannibalization 
If not prohibited by U.N.-sponsored and general multilateral treaties, Internet gambling will eventually destroy 
global economic stability. Addiction rates associated with gambling exist in proportion to the speed of the 
gambling activity.196 The faster the gambling activity, the more highly addictive it is, and the more addictive the 
gambling activity is, the more revenue it will generate for the industry.197 Again, this is because as Associate 
Professor Howard Shaffer of the Harvard Division on Addictions reported: “Gambling… changes the 
neurochemistry of the brain.”198 Reflecting on the potential impact of Internet gambling, Shaffer stated, “As 
smoking crack cocaine changed the cocaine experience, I think electronics is going to change the way gambling 
is experienced.”199 This is reinforced by studies showing that twenty-seven to fifty-five percent of casino 
revenues come from pathological and problem gamblers,200 and eighty percent of casino revenues come from 
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video gambling.201 The ubiquitous nature of Internet gambling places it in every home and with access to every 
demographic group—especially children. 
Internet gambling has all the characteristics of video gambling, but its reach is far more sweeping and the 
potential consequences much more dire. Estimates concluded that approximately nine million people had online 
investing accounts by 1999202 and that by 2003, online brokerage accounts would be valued at $3.3 trillion.203 
The implications were obvious. In very little time, any person with instant online access to credit card, bank, 
and investment accounts could incur sizable credit card debt to overseas gambling companies and lose all of 
their assets almost instantaneously. 
The addictive nature of the activity and its built-in mega-profits create a substantial market for online 
gambling. Industry analysts valued the market at approximately $7 billion in 1999, and it was projected to rise 
to $10 billion in the year 2000.204 By 1999, there was already a significant market for online gambling, but the 
newness, size, and scope of the market was luring many other potential operators. At the time the Final Report 
of the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission was published, a significant number of jurisdictions already had laws 
in place to issue Internet gambling licenses.205 Thereafter, this number continued to increase.206 
The absence of geographical restrictions on the Internet posed an enormous problem for gambling 
providers as competitors. Many of the online gambling sites in operation during the 1990s were based in 
offshore casinos and were subject to minimal, if any, tax obligations, regulation, or security.207 While many 
online gamblers could question the integrity of these sites and be hesitant to frequent them, these sites could 
also offer the best returns in the industry because their profit margins would be significantly greater than those 
market participants subject to more rigorous taxation. 
New entrants into the field needed to compete with the offshore casinos, as must the prior existing 
land-based (and primarily U.S.) casino industry. This intensified the competition for one country to 
economically cannibalize another country via Internet gambling as, for example, Canada had cannibalized the 
U.S. economy by locating casinos along the Canada-U.S. border. The U.S. response by the cannibalized states 
was to propose and/or build their own casinos to recapture the gambling dollars going to Canada—a situation 
emphasizing the U.S. State Department’s need to negotiate amendments to its FCN bilateral and multilateral 
treaties to prohibit “transboundary economic raiding” via gambling activities. 
Regardless of these determinations, another problem was that for existing gambling interests to remain 
profitable, they would have to remain competitive with online gambling sites. Obviously, this scenario would 
lead to continued pressures to reduce gambling taxes and thereby tax revenue, despite the inevitably 
accumulating social costs associated with gambling. The Australian Productivity Commission heard arguments 
to this effect when a group of Australian casinos pointed out that “if they are not to kill off their domestic 
gambling industries, States will need to lower gambling taxes as competition from the Internet emerges.”208 
They validly queried whether “in the long run we are likely to have any alternative than a zero tax.”209 
C. Treatment for Gambling Addictions 
The 1999 U.S. National Gambling Impact Study Commission unanimously called for a “pause in the expansion 
of gambling” as part of a moratorium, in part because pathological gambling was considered a difficult disorder 
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to treat—with many experts claiming it could never be cured, only repressed. “As with substance abuse, 
treatment for pathological gambling is a costly, time-consuming effort, often without quick results and with a 
high degree of re-occurrence.”210 The Commission credited the American Gaming Association, the gambling 
industry’s lobbying group, with recognizing and taking some initiative to address the problem of pathological 
gambling. However, as the Commission noted, “industry funds earmarked for treatment for pathological 
gambling are miniscule compared to that industry’s total revenue.”211 Indeed, it could be argued that the 
gambling industry has a vested interest in not curing pathological gamblers of their disease because pathological 
and problem gamblers constitute a major source of industry revenue. 
In its assessment of available treatment courses and resources for pathological gamblers,212 the NGISC 
listed Gamblers Anonymous as “one of the most important non-profit groups working in this area.”213 The 
Commission also found the recidivism rate of pathological gamblers to be substantial and cited to the fact that 
according to the only known study assessing the effectiveness of the Gamblers Anonymous’ program, a mere 
eight percent of its members had abstained from gambling activities at the end of a year.214 
Vanessa Hua’s article on the high incidence of problem gambling in Asian-American populations points to 
the magnitude of the problem facing treatment providers. In a study, the Chinese Health Coalition found that 
nearly seventy percent of the Chinese-Americans it surveyed ranked gambling as the greatest problem 
confronting their home lives and communities, surpassing concerns about gangs and drugs. Language and other 
cultural barriers, combined with insufficient funding, has resulted in little, if any, recourse for those who seek 
treatment.215 
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Policy Alternatives and Recommendations 
 
Legalized gambling, when analyzed at a strategic macro-economic level, was a no-win proposition for 
individual countries, as well as the international economy. The massive amount of capital that accrues to the 
gambling industry at the expense of the public, destabilizes economies by effectively foreclosing opportunities 
for new and pre-existing, non-gambling industries, and by imposing social and rehabilitative costs on society 
which tax revenues are insufficient to cover. The vast expenditure of money by pro-casino interests suggested 
“unbalanced decision-making processes by elected officials, regulatory agencies, and even the court system.”216 
The United States needed to take a proactive approach to minimize the destructive, destabilizing impact of 
the transnational economic raiding inherent in legalized gambling activities. First, the United States, as leader of 
the international economy, was prodded to spearhead international discussions concerning the viability of 
gambling as a tool for economic growth. These discussions were to be conducted with the ultimate goal of 
instituting international multilateral treaties designed to combat the transnational economic raiding between 
countries caused by government-sanctioned gambling activities. Unfortunately, efforts in this area were difficult 
due to U.S. domestic gambling policy—or, more accurately, the lack of a U.S. gambling policy. Forcing the 
issue in the international arena without setting a workable U.S. standard as a model was deemed essentially 
inconsistent. Until the United States committed to different policy decisions on the domestic level, economic 
isolationists would argue that the United States needed to assure that its citizens were incubated from the 
dangers implicit in the spread of international legalized gambling. To this end, the United States would need, for 
example, to effectively legislate against the specialized dangers of Internet gambling, relying not on outdated 
laws such as the Wire Act,217 which were designed to apply to other technology and passed in view of different 
concerns. Since most transfers to Internet gambling operations are accomplished through banks or credit cards, 
holding these service providers responsible for illegal gambling transactions would deter much unwanted 
behavior. Absent effective measures in these types of issue areas, the U.S. economy would be transferring a 
substantial portion of its citizens’ assets, but not the accompanying social costs, to other jurisdictions. 
For the United States to achieve its goal of domestic and international economic stability, it needed to 
address the domestic state-sanctioned gambling issue. The first step required for effective change was to 
undermine the unbalanced influence pro-casino interests had on the legislative processes. Several measures 
needed to be taken to accomplish this goal. First, the federal government needed to undercut interstate 
cannibalism by assuming jurisdiction over gambling-related industries by invoking the Commerce Clause. The 
federal government then would have an option. The U.S. Congress could and should, with the exception of Las 
Vegas and Atlantic City (because the industry is too deeply embedded in the social fabric of the cities) ban 
legalized gambling in its entirety. Preexisting gambling casinos and accompanying hotels and restaurants could 
be transformed into educational institutions, trade schools, and colleges using the gambling industry’s own 
revenues. Although industry interests would claim substantial repercussions from such decisions, they have 
already made many times their returns on investment and would lose nothing, while the states would gain an 
educated public, as well as new consumer dollars pump-priming the economy. A decision to this end would also 
mitigate the problems surrounding ill-adapted and deficient treatment programs for pathological and problem 
gamblers. Short of this measure, the federal government should impose a tax structure upon legalized gambling 
operations that reflects the cost they impose on society, such as the Canadian model where taxes are 100 percent 
with only management fees going to the casino companies. The U.S. government should appropriate the 
revenue collected and allocate it to treatment and rehabilitation programs for pathological and problem 
gamblers, as well as for educational buy-outs of the gambling establishments. 
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The United States wields an enormous amount of power in determining global policy and bears a proportionate 
burden to structure its economy to minimize deprivation, poverty, and instability. Legalized gambling is an 
enormous problem for both the U.S. and the international economies. The inherently addictive nature of 
gambling activities makes it an untenable burden on society. Strategic cost-benefit analysis shows that gambling 
is a no-win proposition for the United States and for the world. The United States has created a global trend 
toward the legalization of gambling activities. This has spurred a system of transnational economic raiding 
which produces insufficient revenue to cover the bankruptcy, crime, and corruption costs associated with these 
activities. The U.S. Congress has the power to reverse the global trend of economic cannibalism, poverty, and 
instability, and its first step toward this end should be to incubate the United States from the destructive forces 
of Internet gambling. The Congress should also recognize that legalizing gambling activities falls far short of 
maximizing the “public health, safety, and welfare” of U.S. citizens and should legislate nationally on the issue. 
This will give the United States the credibility it needs to effect a change in global perspective and to encourage 
economic stability in the maintenance of a favorable world legal order. 
